Submitted by Thomas Kolbe
The German economic crisis is slowly but surely making its way into the balance sheets of banks. Above all, the crisis in the largely credit-financed Mittelstand is increasingly weighing on savings banks and cooperative banks.
The year 2025 is ending as a disastrous year for the German economy. Around 24,000 companies filed for insolvency—a record figure, surpassed only in the crisis year 2003 following the bursting of the dotcom bubble and the subsequent recession. Back then, a total of 39,000 companies went bankrupt.
Deindustrialization and Loan Defaults
Loan defaults in the past year are estimated at around €57 billion. These losses hit suppliers and banks hard, especially since the German Mittelstand finances roughly 40% through savings banks and 25% through cooperative banks.
Already in the previous year, losses from corporate insolvencies had accumulated to around €59 billion. The causes have long been known: the persistent weakness of the German economy results from a toxic mix of overregulation, climate-policy-driven deindustrialization, a self-inflicted energy crisis, and high fiscal burdens. This poisonous cocktail severely strains the economy, weakens private demand, and makes industrial production in Germany increasingly unattractive on the international stage.
The ripple effects of a roughly 20% drop in industrial production reach far into other sectors. Supplier companies as well as industry-related services are increasingly under pressure—and are collapsing in many areas.
Pressure Beneath the Surface
At first glance, the German banking sector still appears stable. Industry giant Deutsche Bank increased its pre-tax profit in Q3 2025 by 8% year-on-year to €2.4 billion. The bank saw growth across all business areas—from traditional lending to investment banking to asset management.
The situation is different for cooperative banks. Volks- und Raiffeisenbanken already suffered a 25% drop in profits last year compared to the previous year. Further revenue declines are expected for 2025. The main reasons are the persistently weak economy, rising geopolitical tensions, and higher risk provisions in the face of growing credit default risks.
Germany’s once stable three-pillar banking model—private large banks, public-sector institutions like savings banks and state banks, and cooperative banks—still shows outward growth. But beneath the surface, deep cracks are forming: years of low interest rates have sharply squeezed bank margins, and the abrupt interest rate reversal is weighing on both businesses and consumers. Added to this is the problematic close entanglement between cooperative banks and politics.
For example, the agricultural cooperative BayWa in Bavaria nearly went bankrupt after engaging in global renewable energy investments—leaving a €100 million loss.
This example illustrates the risks of political steering of the banking sector through public institute credit guarantees like KfW. Nowadays, billions are channeled annually into the climate economy and the military sector—keeping a zombie economy afloat that could never survive in a free capital market.
Examples of the emerging banking crisis are multiplying: VR-Bank Dortmund Nordwest suffered losses of €280 million from risky real estate fund investments, requiring a bailout from the Cooperative Protection Fund (BVR).
VR-Bank Bad Salzungen-Schmalkalden lost a similar amount in dubious real estate deals two years ago and also called on the BVR for rescue. These cases show that banks, facing a declining credit business with the Mittelstand, are forced to move outward on the risk curve to generate operational profits.
The effects are tangible: a BaFin analysis shows that last year, about 1.9% of savings bank loans and 2.2% of cooperative bank loans were non-performing. This corresponds to a volume of €36.5 billion—a 25% increase from the previous year. Consequently, banks are forced to increase credit risk provisions—freezing more capital and making new loans harder to grant.
\Branch Closures and a Mortgage Crisis on the Horizon
Raiffeisenbank Hochtaunus recently fell into serious financial trouble after making €500 million in value adjustments to its real estate portfolio.
Creaking sounds are coming from all corners of the German economy. It is expected that the economic crisis will translate into a crisis of regional banks’ mortgage portfolios, alongside private insolvencies. Stress in the banking system is increasing quarter by quarter.
Banks are responding to growing pressure with tough measures. Over 1,000 bank branches are closed annually in Germany. The local Sparkasse may soon become a thing of the past. This not only makes personal consultations harder for older customers but also hits bank clients in rural areas. Small and medium-sized enterprises, craft businesses, bakeries, and local retailers who rely on personal financial advice increasingly find fewer direct contacts and a trusted banking environment.
Balance Sheet Damage Becomes Visible
Bank balance sheets reflect the overall economic situation. At the same time, they are influenced by financial and fiscal policy developments. Years of elevated loan defaults erode the financial substance of banks just as much as the globally high sovereign debt, which has caused significant devaluations of bond holdings on balance sheets.
In short: the longer the crisis in the private economy persists and the more it is exacerbated by fiscal undiscipline and growing government debt, the lower the lending potential of the banking sector.
This is precisely the crux of monetary policy. The European Central Bank can lower interest rates and private sector financing costs all it wants. Lending in the real economy is determined by the interaction between private companies and credit-granting banks.
Unless Germany’s economic outlook brightens considerably—which, under current political conditions, is unlikely—lending will significantly slow on the one hand, while defaults accelerate on the other. This would be further evidence that the German economy is continuing to sink deeper and deeper into a contraction phase.
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About the author: Thomas Kolbe is a German graduate economist. For over 25 years, he has worked as a journalist and media producer for clients from various industries and business associations. As a publicist, he focuses on economic processes and observes geopolitical events from the perspective of the capital markets. His publications follow a philosophy that focuses on the individual and their right to self-determination.
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contemplator) wrote2026-01-04 05:02 pm
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